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This essay critically evaluates the present moment of representation in social 
media of various subjects by looking back and interrogating past representations 
of technology and otherness in Hollywood cinema.  Specifically, I argue that 
Ridley Scott’s cult classic film Bladerunner (1982) offers us a window into 
thinking about technology-as-other as portrayed in a historical moment that 
charted out the rise of neoliberalism under Ronald Reagan in the USA and Mar-
garet Thatcher in the UK. I draw on G.W.F. Hegel’s theorization of human sub-
jectivity and power relations in his master-slave dialectic to analyze the rela-
tionship between humans and synthetic androids, also known as replicants, in 
the film.  In engaging Hegel’s analysis of power and servitude, I reveal myriad 
discourses of gazing that structure power not only within the narrative of the 
science fiction film, but moreover between the audience and the images. I con-
clude that the network of gazes between androids and humans highlight the 
ways in which human consciousness too is fabricated as well as mediated in and 
through the other(s).   
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Perhaps more than ever before, global movements for social justice that center around 
race and gender, like hashtag activism movements including #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter, 
have proliferated from technologies that pundits predicted would fail in the wake of a Y2K 
holocaust 18 years ago.  Indeed, when we reflect upon it, national identities from India, the 
                                                 
1   School of Arts and Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia. Email: Ra-
hul.Gairola@murdoch.edu.au. 
Acknowledgments: The author wishes to thank professors Jennifer Bean, Kate Cummings, Pami Dua, Vijay 
Mishra, Ingrid Richardson, Amritjit Singh, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak for counsel while completing this 
essay.   
Gairola                                                                                            Android Matters 
18 
USA, and the nations in between seem over determined by doomsday scenarios characterised 
by technological innovation. Technology seems ubiquitous, and punctuates daily life in tacit 
ways that normalize the most mundane moments in which we take for granted the electronic 
and cybernetic hands that guide us so.  In meditating on how past representations of apocalyptic 
technology have shaped the ways in which we think of science fiction film, humanities com-
puting, and what is now called “digital humanities” today, I want to open with a historiograph-
ical query.  In seeking a panoramic view of these social movements and technology today, I 
want to ask: how did we arrive at a moment when Facebook is globally scandalized and the 
1% deploy technology to secure global capital?  More specifically, how have representations 
of technology during the rise of neoliberal capitalism portrayed technology, gender, and race?   
 This question is especially important today when we excavate the daily ways in which 
technology reveals and/ or conceals human identities.  As I have elsewhere argued, even di-
asporic sexualities are worth examining in the representation of digital media (Gairola 2018, 
55). Reflecting back upon American cinematic productions that depict the future, for example, 
there appears to be a conflation of global dystopia with the so-called Third World though, 
predictably, through a hegemonic lens of heteronormative, white male privilege. This lens 
seems to produce identification with certain audience members that necessarily indexes racial 
affiliation while it solicits, even in its over determined, spectacular fiction, a particular return 
gaze of the audience.  This visual transaction is akin to Louis Althusser’s famous notion of 
“interpellation” wherein a police officer “hails” a person in the street, thus confirming his/ her 
“fixed residence” or designation in the world (Althusser 2001, 121).  Seeking to move beyond 
Karl Marx’s conceptualization of base and superstructure as the ultimate vertical horizons of 
human experience, Althusser outlines the interlinked societal mechanisms that deploy ideas or 
force to naturalise assimilation. Interpellation is self-recognition at the same time that it demar-
cates human subjugation beneath the sign of assimilation into a proper order – be it gender, 
race, class, caste, nationality, sexuality, religion, colour, creed,  etc.  
 The interpellative act in a cinema hall, rather than on the street, occurs when the im-
ages can retain representational authority over audience members where the depictions become 
larger than life rather than simply imitating life.  Identification occurs precisely where “visibil-
ity is a trap” (Foucault 1979, 200). In the case of Ridley Scottt’s magnum opus Blade Runner 
(1982), identification with a character amounts to disidentification with the world.  The film is 
arguably the forerunner of a long line of subsequent films including Short Circuit (1986), the 
Transformers franchise (2007 – 2017), and the recent, its sequel Blade Runner 2049 (2017), 
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and African American superhero film Black Panther (2018). Such science fiction films are 
timely interventions in social politics on the silver screen that indict the profit and destruction 
motivations of technology in the wrong hands. Scottt’s film braids together robotic masculini-
ties with white servitude, portraying as a viable option migration to the “off-world colonies” 
(Scottt, 1982). This gaze of recognition ensconces a moment of internalized otherness that, like 
traditionally racialized, queered and pathologized deviants, fixates on futuristic androids. This 
pathologization of android subjects is particularly evident during the rise of neoliberal 
Reaganomics in the U.S.A. and Thactherism in the U.K. that influenced the liberalization of 
the market in India about a decade later.   
 Scott's Blade Runner appears to speak directly to Reaganomics’ “trickle down” view 
of the global market in a dystopic future swamped by acid rain and Asian labourers. In this 
dark vision of Los Angeles, technological hybrids of the future are part human and part tech-
nology wherein they are superior to humans in stamina as machines yet far inferior to humans 
for lack of pathos. Against the backdrop of this dark dystopia, Deckard (Harrison Ford) is a 
“blade runner” of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) whose job involves “retiring” 
formidable androids that have been produced by the almighty Tyrell Corporation.  The com-
pany produces these super-human androids, some of which display some emotional capabilities 
(that serve as major themes structuring plot). These androids, which humans refer to as “repli-
cants” and, in a pejorative sense, “skin jobs,” serve as historical citations for us today that 
illustrate how the robotic other was imagined in 1982 along with the filmic techniques that 
underscore these representations.  An added irony here is that Deckard himself is a replicant, 
as we learn at the end of the film, while simultaneously serving as a violent agent of the dys-
topic city’s pogrom of transgressive, cybernetic forms.    
 As such, Blade Runner espouses the sentient goodness of some characters that are 
technological products of the surgically hubristic Tyrell Corporation. Yet, on the other hand, 
its marketable androids are the target of human xenophobia wherein, paradoxically, their tech-
nological sophistication marks them as savage, subhuman, other.  We have seen this familiar 
pattern also in the X-Men franchise, most recently in the film Logan (2017).  As I will further 
demonstrate, the construction of these fraught others, which at once represent the future and 
the inhuman, is proportional to the special effects and film technique invested in visualizing 
the evil “nature” of non-human harbingers of a digitalized and metallic destiny that marks 
doomsday for the human race. Despite their technological innovation, replicants are nonethe-
less beholden to sentient humans that are “weaker” given their composition of flesh and blood 
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despite containing souls.  These androids are, in other words and other worlds, akin to Shake-
speare’s Caliban from The Tempest (1610), or Mary Shelley’s monster from Frankenstein, or 
The Modern Prometheus (1818), non-flesh mendicants whose human counterparts fear and 
revile.  Filmic versions of this menace that are contemporary to Blade Runner include Re-
Animator (1985), Pet Sematary (1989), and Frankenstein Unbound (1990).  
 Such popular mistrust of corporate innovation in film narratives from the early 1980s 
into the 1990s is a veritable reflection of global economic policies at that time while foreshad-
owing darker times to come. The rise of cultural studies in the 1980s carefully excavated the 
ways in which visual representations forged manipulative identificatory relationships with 
viewers. This shows us that filmic narratives reflect the critiques of cultural artifacts that depict 
the complexities of skewed power relations and resistance to oppressive mechanisms of society 
as we tangibly live it. For Todd McGowan, “science-fiction cinema…[allows us] to see ideol-
ogy in a way we would not ordinarily see it” (McGowan 20). These new ways of visualizing 
ideologies by extension also create new ways of identifying with the characters on the big 
screen, even as the filmic narrative portrays them in the future or past. These identificatory 
relationships and unique configurations of android figures as all-powerful subjects arguably 
articulate in the realm of apocalyptic visions some philosophical traces of Hegel’s key ideas.  
 Famous for his notion of idealism that accords complete agency to human sentience 
in opposition to Karl Marx’s materialist conception of history, Hegel's master-slave dialectic 
here offers us a lens for rethinking species of technological others and symbolic acts of gazing.  
In Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel describes a reciprocal process in which two subjects 
encounter on another, both emanating a distinct consciousness.  For Hegel, the master is a 
subject who holds a consciousness that "exists for-itself," the slave is that subject whose con-
sciousness is structured around "existence-for-an-other" in relation to the master (57-8). That 
is, a being’s self-consciousness only attains enlightened knowledge upon recognizing the self-
consciousness of another, and this psychic transaction can be profound and traumatic.  In other 
words, one’s recognized differences in the other have always already invoked one’s similarities 
with the other and thus existence and power is constructed around subjectivity and the con-
scious recognition of it. Hegel details the nuances of this when he writes, “On approaching the 
other [slave] it [the master] has lost its own self, since it finds itself as another being; secondly, 
it has thereby sublated that other, for this primitive consciousness does not regard the other as 
essentially real but sees its own self in the other” (Hegel 1977, 111).   
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 This is to say that the master-slave relationship balances itself upon a mediated gaze: 
the gaze of the slave as reflected back to him/ her by the returned gaze of the master reformu-
lates the dependence of the slave on the master for the master’s very life is at stake only in and 
through the existence of the slave.  Likewise, the master engages in an "existence-for-self that 
is for-self only through-another" (58) as a necessity since s/ he too requires a subject against 
which his/ her own consciousness is juxtaposed and thus realized.  Consciousness exists by 
itself only in so far that it can be recognized as such, and thus the recognizing consciousness 
wields a kind of cryptic power in subordination since its very existence makes possible the 
position of the master that lords above the slave.  Yet what is mediated in this dynamic is the 
raw level of animality that one or the other can accord to its other in the interest of wielding 
“the greater” power. Here, we get to the root of Hegel's master-slave dialectic that can give 
insight into the apocalyptic visions of the future depicted in the film. In Bladerunner, this re-
ciprocal transaction of recognition is fraught because weaker humans symbolically castrate the 
more sophisticated machine, who is nonetheless haunted by fabricated memories and dreams. 
These psychic components always remind androids that they are merely “replicants,” or bad 
copies, of humans that will never possess a soul despite having better looks and endurance than 
humans.  
 This reciprocal and constitutive self-consciousness that exists in and through the eyes 
of the other as obscurely described by Hegel appears in black theorizations of difference, in-
cluding the racialized relationships in the power dynamics of colonialism described by Franz 
Fanon (Fanon 1967, 62). Cinema imbibes, like a hall of mirrors, a network of gazes that are 
exponentially manifest as characters view one another, as viewers gaze upon them through 
mediated POVs (point-of-view shots) of the kino-eye. The gazes and return-gazes in the film 
construct doomed visions of the earth through technologies that contradict Hegelian idealism 
but underscore Marx’s worst nightmares of capitalist innovation. In “Virtual Bodies and Flick-
ering Signifiers” (1990), Katherine Hayles observes, "It is no accident that the vaguely apoca-
lyptic landscapes of films such as Terminator, Bladerunner [sic] and Hardware occur in nar-
ratives focusing on cybernetic life-forms.  The sense that the world is rapidly becoming unin-
habitable by human beings is part of the impetus for the displacement of presence by pattern" 
(36-7).  Hayles' larger project here operates under the assertion that presence has given way to 
pattern and randomness in postmodern movements of the twenty-first century, which films like 
Tron (1982), The Lawnmower Man (1992), and The Matrix (1999) depict through computer-
ized graphics and imagery.   
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 However, I am particularly interested in Hayles’ critical contention because it presents 
a quagmire when using a Hegelian lens to read android figures in Blade Runner. If, as Hayles 
suggests, the earth is uninhabitable and there is no reason to live in these films that render Los 
Angeles uninhabitable, then why should there be any stakes at all for its human (master/ maker) 
and android (slave/ creation) inhabitants?  That is, if the slave exists in relation to the master's 
existence and its own non-threatened life as the master's subject, can the Hegelian dialectic 
apply to android-human relationships?  I would suggest that this very discrepancy, the urgency 
of the android to live in a world that is essentially doomed, fleshes out the applicability of the 
Hegelian dialectic even in the futuristic face-off between man and machine, given man’s as-
sumption that the human shall always out-live the inhuman. To put this another way, the battery 
will always wear down, and where the power source does not would be the cause of great 
anxiety indeed as machine becomes the master of man.  This anxiety indeed drives the plot of 
Blade Runner, and perhaps also partly explains why there is so much negative insinuation em-
bedded around “skin” when humans pejoratively refer to replicants.    
 Yet in addition to compelling the audience to critically interrogate the androids’ loy-
alty to humans, the film also problematizes that which perhaps most defines humans – the 
ability to have their own memories.  For as McGowan notes, the Tyrell Corporation designs 
Deckard’s memory implants to purposefully fool him into thinking he is human, thus exposing 
“the ideological nature of memory itself” in the film (McGowan 2009, 26).  In addition, there 
is always the fear that our own creation of a prodigal form of technology may efface the human 
race but find, through the superior brilliance bestowed upon it by a human, a means to survive 
mechanically while the earth as an organic whole begins to wilt due to nuclear war, global 
warming, etc. As Michel Foucault has noted, one technology of society that ensures procreation 
of economy is the institution of marriage underpinned by heteronormative romance (1990, 36-
37). Marriage as such promotes a disciplinary function of the nation state in the manufacture 
of docile bodies to constitute a “democratic citizenry.”  While Scott’s 1982 film only touches 
upon this theme, Bladerunner 2049 (2017), the former’s sequel, moves in this direction by 
blurring the boundaries that divide human and machine, while emptying out reproduction’s 
need for amorous sex or kinship relations based on blood and caste.   
 However, Deckard and antagonist Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer), a replicant which Tyrell 
himself designs as the epitome of racialized masculinity, both inhabit spaces outside of human 
law and matrimony in the first film. Marriage here is key since it is the nexus as which human-
ity, love, and reproduction cohabitate and allow flesh and blood humans to produce memories 
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together rather than singularly. Deckard and Roy’s existence as master and slave, hunter and 
hunted, consequently pose a threat to these societal institutions because they symbolize the 
evolution of non-human reproductive possibilities beyond blood kinship and the obliteration 
of the line that divides the human from the android. The stakes for these androids are high in 
the context of Hegelian dialectics for the destruction/ mutation of the earth does not equate to 
death, thus its consciousness is and is not dependent on the human/ master. In other words, 
while android/ slave (also creation) requires the human/ master (also creator) to affirm its ex-
istence at some level, it is the life of the master that becomes threatened by the presence of the 
android/ slave.  That is, the precarious state of life inverts on the very pivot that one demarcated 
the line between man and machine.     
 In Bladerunner, the hunted replicants (androids) become rogue hunters against the 
backdrop of a Third World mash-up of Asia and Central America.  As Lisa Lowe puts it, “In 
Blade Runner’s version of the 21st century, it is no longer necessary to travel out to see ‘the 
world’: ‘the world’ has come and now inhabits, indeed possesses, Los Angeles” (Low 1996, 
84).  The dystopic sheen of the future is waxed heavy by a Third Word future in which androids/ 
slaves, or “replicants” as the protagonist Deckard calls them, seem to fit right in.  That is, 
cybernetic criminality and servitude seem befitting to this version of Los Angeles as the Third 
World while rich citizens await migration to the “off-world colonies.” Perhaps this inclusion 
among humans is the resultant success of Tyrell's motto of “More human than human” (Scottt, 
1982).  The proud father of the Aryan-looking Nexus 6 model Roy, Tyrell faces his creation 
towards the end of the film when Roy approaches him in search of "more life" after learning 
that the Nexus 6 models all have a built-in shelf life.   
 Here, the master/ slave dialectic visually plays out between the intensities of the two 
characters mutual gazing as mediated to our own eyes through the kino-eye of the camera, 
overlapping the tropes of looking. Scott tightly frames this sequence but utilizing close-shots 
that highlight the anxiety produced by this exchange: Tyrell brushes Roy's head while urging 
him to "revel" in his time, and Roy draws him close and plants a kiss on his lips.  Against the 
backdrop of flickering shadows and candlelight, Roy forces his thumbs into the struggling 
man's eyes, killing him by blinding him. Scottt heightens the anxiety of this telling moment by 
framing the entire sequence in extreme close shot-reverse shots between Roy and Tyrell with 
close shots of an artificial owl, eyes glowing in the dark, and horrified Sebastian witnessing 
the murder. This scene presents a complex of gazes ricocheting within the scene, mediated by 
the eye of the camera and filtered through our own.  This network of gazes, with the exception 
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of Roy's, absorb the fear that has been displaced on them from the "retirement" of the subject 
as object of that gaze. Like the homoerotic/ incestuous thrill shared for a moment between the 
creator and his creation, the film medium sends ripples of this same thrill through viewers as 
the shock of taboo becomes a visual adhesive that transfixes viewers.   
 Perhaps this is the potentially negative aspects of the current “real time” that we con-
sumers live in.  In “The Ecstasy of Communication” (1983), Baurdrillard has complained that 
flat, non-reflective surfaces that profoundly affect the reticent consumer have taken over “truth-
ful” (read as "metaphysical" in my context) sign systems.  He writes, "The subject himself, 
suddenly transformed, becomes a computer at the wheel, not a drunken demiurge of power. 
The vehicle now becomes a kind of capsule, its dashboard the brain, the surrounding landscape 
unfolding like a televised screen (instead of a live-in projectile as it was before) (127). While 
Baudrillard's implication in this piece is that technology as such is a "bad thing," I would offer 
that the very problematic aspects of technology also provide the amenities of it that we love so 
much. Returning to the notion that Ridley displaces on viewers the homoerotic/ incestual anx-
iety between Roy and Tyrell just before the latter’s death, viewers may enjoy the fantasy of 
this sequence but never indulge in one like it or ever have the opportunity to.  If film was not 
one such capsule capable of transforming the brain into a dashboard, what would be the point?  
Would the signification of the formal aspects of the sequence (extreme close shots with darkly 
lit backgrounds) hold any ground without the displacement of anxiety and emotion?   
 My sense is that such displacement of anxiety and emotion is necessary to remotely 
enjoy science fiction noir films though its existence would trouble Baudrillard since this im-
plies (like romantic relationships between cyborgs and humans) that humans can establish an 
audiovisual cathexsis with an inorganic and/or unnatural entity.  For we are staring into an 
unflinching abyss of images in which we identify aspects of our own subjectivity.  The trou-
bling anxiety emanated from the murder of Tyrell arises from our witness of the death of the 
master by the hands of the slave, who has used the life given to him to kill its creator. Since 
there is no life to be had and the master himself is expendable, suddenly he occupies the slave-
as-object position as commodity to be fetishized in relation to the configuration of his equally 
dependent subjectivity. But without the loaded "return gaze" of the co-subject, Roy is no longer 
dependant on the creator he once thought could supply him with more life -- the master who 
"exists-for-itself" no longer exists for anything in death as the slave finds that the "existence-
for-an-other" also dies along with the master.  Perhaps this is why Roy kills his maker by 
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gouging out his eyes, which betray the synthetic lives of replicants when scanned by detecting 
tools. 
 But the Tyrell Corporation, the metaphorical master, lives on and Roy dies like a mar-
tyr in a crucifixion style that illustrates the master's (human's) ultimate control over the slave 
(cyborg) though he has been killed. The ideology of the master outlives his body and takes the 
life of the slave, which we see in Blade Runner when Roy tells Deckard, "It's quite an experi-
ence to live in fear.  That's what it is to be a slave" before retiring (Scott, 1993). As such, Roy 
embodies aspects of what Haraway (1985) has famously defined as a “cyborg.”  In her cele-
brated essay, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 
1980s,” Haraway writes, "A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a creature of social reality as well 
as a creature of fiction…The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics.  The cyborg is a 
condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring 
any possibility of historical transformation . . . The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; 
it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-Oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other seductions 
to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher 
unity" (67).   
 Though it is unclear to me exactly how a cyborg is "our ontology" (whose?), it seems 
safe to expand Haraway's definition from post-gender, cybernetic organism to most urban hu-
man beings on earth.  We are all mired in technological appendages that bind us to various 
roles of master and servant across our short lives, prisoners in “off-world colonies” due to the 
devices that have interfaced with flesh and bone. As we see in the opulent technoscapes, to use 
Appadurai’s term (1990, 98), of Blade Runner, the hyperreal circulation of capital around the 
world has ensured the mass proliferation of technology, and most people around the world 
regularly carry on their bodies an electromagnetic apparatus (credit/ bank card, cell phone, 
beeper, etc.).  We may even consider the PC with its myriad programs an extension of the self, 
the mouse simply a third hand, the clicker merely a sixth finger.  Following this logic, neither 
cyborg nor android can always be post-gender - in fact, such a claim would undermine the 
upright shape and form a cyborg mimes as the product of a human being whose body is heavily 
encoded by gender.  For gender is always also mired in power relations, as is the master and 
slave relationship; even the fact that Roy and the other replicants have a shelf life indicates that 
they are emasculated by their limited time in a Third World Los Angeles.   
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 Gender is moreover significant here in the context of Deckard and Roy’s android mas-
culinities and the ways in which other characters like Tyrell and Sebastian die off in the film.  
Indeed, for these characters, death is a form of emasculation; erasure from the film operates as 
a symbolic castration of agency, visibility, patriarchy. For now, let us concede that an android 
and/ or cyborg, in my own hybridized formulation of Haraway's, is any futuristic subject whose 
very subjectivity depends upon technology to sustain its daily practices.  The nexus point is an 
interface between flesh and the body (a hand on a mouse, a bankcard in the wallet, etc.) that is 
not overdetermined by genetic engineering or the physical fusion of flesh with mechanics.  Let 
us consider the replicant "skin jobs" manufactured in 2019 by the Tyrell Corporation in 
Bladerunner.  These beings are a product of "robot evolution" whose genetically engineered 
bodies are not metallic bone structures overlaid with flesh, rather humans designed with supe-
rior strength and agility powers for use as slaves in the exploration and colonization of other 
planets.  As beings that embody a great deal of their makers' traits, Nexus models like Roy and 
Pris feel physical pain, can bleed, and as we learn in the beginning of the film and witness 
towards its end, also feel emotion.   
 The ability, perhaps I should rather say privilege, of androids to pass as human in 
Bladerunner depends on the extent to which they look and act just like humans, and hence, as 
masters, versus “bad copies” of humans.  In “Making Cyborgs, Making Humans: Of Termina-
tors and Blade Runners,” Pyle notes that, in films like Blade Runner, “we may start out with 
our assumptions of a clear distinction between human and machine in tact; but through its 
representation of the hybrid figure of the cyborg, the film 'plays' on a borderline that we come 
to see as shifting and porous, one that begins to confuse the nature of opposition and the values 
we ascribe to it” (1993, 229).  It follows that the more riddled the boundaries between man and 
machine are, the more complicated become the politics of gazing and ensuing paradigms of 
domination and subordination -- this naturally disrupts any clear way of neatly applying the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic. Roy’s emotive speech after saving Deckard’s life and soon 
before proclaiming his expiry date and dying powerfully illustrates the impossible distinctions 
between humans and “skin jobs.” In the film’s finale, Roy and Deckard finally face-off, and 
the good android/ cyborg prevails because though it is not human, it emulates humanistic char-
acter traits.  And, as Pyle further notes, Blade Runner destabilizes the concept of the human by 
using the cinematic spectacle of the movie (231).  
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 Filmmaking technology thus facilitates character construction, hence formal aspects 
of filmmaking are a discursive strategy in the cinematic visualization of the terminators' char-
acteristics and the reflection of narrative. The state-of-the-art filmmaking technologies that 
create the vivid illusions of Hollywood cinema take an integral role in the visual construction 
of both Deckard and Roy replicants, and, subsequently, the characteristics of both.  At the end 
of Blade Runner, when Roy saves the life of Deckard and delivers his famous “tears in the 
rain” monologue before shutting off, we see that the Nexus-6 model is perhaps “more human” 
than the “more human” model that is Deckard.  The death of murderous perfection witnessed 
by its own kind – a slave dying before a slave, that is – revises the earlier scene in which the 
slave kills its master. One of the slaves that humans once used as forced labour to colonize off-
world planets has saved the master’s life before succumbing to death. To understand the He-
gelian dialectic in the context of android/ human relations is to survey the evolution of social 
ideology in relation to technology that morals could never before have imagined. Although this 
may seem to be a futile task since I am casting a pan-historical eye over the treatment of species 
of others (otherworldly aliens, racialized others, queer subjects, monsters, colonized peoples, 
cyborgs, etc.), it can be important for critics to do in the prediction of how tropes of othering 
will evolve. 
 In other words, master/ slave binaries operate upon the same yet masked ideologies 
of bias that fortify the dividing lines between white/ black, straight/ queer, human/ cyborg, etc.  
Yet we see in the signs generated by technology, whether they be on the screen, orbiting the 
earth, awaiting mass murder or re-defining capital, the absorption and reformulation of other-
ness. The politics of difference are complex when the other is an appendage of us, and wherein 
representation in science fiction film suggests that death in the company of an other can be a 
kind of epiphany in comparison to death by gouging out one’s eyes. It is precisely, in other 
words, abjection of the technological other that cements a cathexsis between it and the human 
agent who wishes to reject it only in so far at it is a “bad copy” of the human – a trait that can 
only be measured through the eyes of the skin jobs. For on-screen simulations or "real" pro-
cesses involving the "cyborgification" of the human race and the erotic fusion of flesh and 
metal, the technology fueled by transnational capital promises the potential to become a com-
mon earthly experience.  From Scottt’s dreary 2019 that reflects the year in which Blade 
Runner was released, 1982, to the present, the blurring of man and machine makes it ever more 
questionable exactly who is subject to who or what.  
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 In the 2017 sequel, the urgent quest of Officer K the bladerunner (Ryan Gosling) is to 
destroy all evidence that replicants can reproduce on their own, and hence blur the line between 
master and slave (Villeneuve 2017).  The sequel complicates the Hegelian dialectic as it situ-
ates reproduction as the mediator between master and slave with an impending, and parlays 
into the filmic narrative the familiar anxieties of miscegenation between black and white Amer-
icans from the late 19th century into the late 20th century. When the face of the other shifts from 
an in-person experience to one facilitated by an ethernet connection, indeed, as Hayles argues 
in “Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers,” that “pattern and randomness becomes an over-
arching effect of life” (1999, 25).  Ironically, this dehumanization of humans, the uprise of 
pattern and randomness, is a liberating process that deconstructs the metaphysical values that 
characterize the human (thus non-human, thus monster, queer, racial other, etc.).  Such patterns 
are intertextual and multilayered, like skin tissues layered upon each other that return us to the 
most basic functions of organic life and its material needs that both Marx and Althusser outline 
in their major works.  Marxist concerns appear to surface at the end of Blade Runner 2049 with 
an organised resistance against to the corporate behemoth.      
 In his Marxist study of textuality The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act, Frederic Jameson has argued that "texts come before us as the always-already-
read; we apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or--if the text 
is brand-new--through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inher-
ited interpretive traditions" (1981, 9). Jameson’s contention, written the year before Scottt’s 
film appeared in theaters, describes the relationships between texts as they build upon one an-
other in a way that resembles both subjects of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic as they simulta-
neously construct one another’s subjectivity and agency. Yet, at the end of the day, Roy demon-
strates the superior virtues of both the master and slave against the dystopic slum of Los An-
geles – the on-world colony turned into an Asian slum in contrast to the galactic colonies that 
advertisements loudly glorify.  In the words of Vijay Mishra, who compares the film to Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), Roy challenges “the moral primacy of humans and their pro-
prietorial claims to complete emotional plenitude… In the case of Roy Batty the creator's re-
fusal to grant him a longer life turns to violence as the son literally gouges his father's eyes out. 
Ridley Scott's Blade Runner, then, turns the table on humans by giving the morally unimpeach-
able position to Batty who, in a further twist to the Monster's original dialogue, introduces the 
elements of slavery, fear, and death into the precursor narrative of Mary Shelley” (Mishra 1994, 
210-211).  
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 In and through his mercy for Deckard upon his own deathbed, Roy demonstrates that 
the subhuman technological miracle of AI is that which we can identify with and find deep 
within ourselves.  Indeed, the audience’s gaze comes to empathize with Roy, either through 
white privilege or a negation of white masculinity, even as it views the non-represented sub-
jects of the off-world colonies as imagined others. That is, we identify with Deckard as the 
protagonist, the more-human android, and with Roy’s merciful act in saving the master that he 
easily could have murdered. For, in the twenty-first century, most urban humans are cyborgs 
that emulate a sense of gender that technologies like those depicted in Blade Runner can help 
dissolve. Indeed, there seems to be more in common between Deckard and Roy than there is 
with the gritty Asians that populate futuristic Los Angeles and the unseen settlers who are 
choosing to call the off-world colonies “home.”  Though such possibilities will once more 
morph the master/ slave dialectic rather than fully overwriting it, its fluid play between contexts 
can perhaps provide humans with avoiding the inconspicuous pitfall of being fully devoted to 
any one way of thinking, living or being.  I would argue that this is especially applicable to 
specious claims that a single woman character can represent “all women in general” (Maurya 
et al 2018, 213). Sweeping generalizations like these flatten differences by fetishising gendered 
body parts, and hardly make for solid scholarship in the realm of film analysis, nor do they do 
scholarly justice to second, third, and/ or fourth wave feminism.     
 Indeed, I would conclude that the gendered taxonomies that file beings as human or 
other are part of the problem rather than the myopic prescription for any kind of social justice 
– even for the replicants.  For as Marleen Barr reminds us, “Although blade runners and humans 
are two types of humans, they are, nonetheless, all humans who possess memories and feel-
ings…the notion that memory differentiates humans from metahumans is a myth used by the 
Blade Runner society to justify oppression” (Barr 1991, 28). Memories and the subjects they 
capture are always mediated testaments to the past.  This may provide us insight into why 
Hegelian ideas about idealism and the dialectic are informative for analyzing the apocalyptic 
visions of the future since the 1980s; they are perhaps more important today, in the era of social 
media activism, than ever before. As we plunge deeper into sovereign regimes that aggressively 
cast humans as monsters to justify instutionalised genocides while human labour is further 
automated, we will need to be more aware and vigilant.  For human consciousness and critique 
of the power relations that structure masters and slaves, and the representational histories that 
shape them, are vital in re-thinking the stakes of life in the 21st century.                                                                   
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